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This paper deals with the effects of political decentralisation on economic growth in Spain, an 
issue that has generated heated debates in recent decades. Our analysis of the last three and a half 
decades, a period characterised by the weak narrowing of the income per capita gap within regions, 
does not offer conclusive results on convergence and points to the importance of alternative factors. 
Several proxies were used to capture the decentralisation process. We also studied some potential 
interactions between decentralisation and other variables. All in all, our empirical evidence shows 
robustly that transferring more responsibilities to subnational governments does not signifi cantly 
affect growth in any sense.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
The approval of the Spanish Constitution (CE, henceforth) in 1978 marked the 
beginning of the development of what is called the State of the Autonomous 
Communities, with the establishment of 17 Autonomous Communities (CC.AA, 
henceforth). The decentralisation process involved the transfer of powers from 
the central government to the CC.AA. Nevertheless, not all the CC.AA have the 
same power and the speed of this devolutionary process has also been different 
among them. We can distinguish three types of CC.AA (Figure 1): the ones that 
used Article 143 of the CE, the ones that used Article 151 of the CE, and the Foral 
Communities. The CC.AA of Article 143 of the CE assumed a group of common 
competences at the beginning such as the promotion of regional economic devel-
opment, public works, housing, railways and roads, ports and airports, agriculture 
and fishing, environmental protection, tourism, economic regulation, culture and 
social welfare, but education and health were not yet their responsibility. Mean-
while, the CC.AA of Article 151 of the CE, thought for the historical nationali-
ties, gained more powers sooner, as did the foral ones, which also had their own 
Figure 1. Subnational distribution in Spain: 17 Autonomous Communities
SPANISH REGIONAL GROWTH: IS DECENTRALISATION IMPORTANT? 391
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
fiscal and economic regimes. Two regions keep the taxes collected in their terri-
tories and transfer a quota to the central government. In contrast, in the rest of the 
regions taxes are collected by the central government, which gives those regions 
a share of these taxes to finance the tasks they perform. 
The central administration takes care of foreign policy, defence, justice, so-
cial security, citizenship, immigration, and unemployment benefits, and it has a 
transversal power over the promotion of economic activity, as it sets the basis and 
coordinates the general planning of the economic activity. 
In this paper, we test the convergence hypothesis and explore the potential ef-
fect of the decentralisation process on regional GDP per capita growth. We try to 
focus on the policy scope, that is, the range of policies for which a regional gov-
ernment has decision-making powers. The results seem to confirm the existence 
of conditional beta convergence, although at a very low pace. Traditional factors 
considered in regional convergence literature and new ones treated in this paper 
(such as decentralisation) do not appear to have had a statistically relevant role 
in the reduction of disparities within Spain, meaning that the convergence policy 
has not fulfilled its objective.
The rest of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the relationship between decentralisation and economic growth. Section 3 takes a 
look at the data and statistical sources, and explains the indicators used as proxies 
of decentralisation. Section 4 presents the econometric specification based on the 
system GMM (generalised method of moments) estimator for dynamic panels. In 
Section 5, the results from the empirical analysis are discussed. Finally, the last 
section concludes and summarises the most relevant outcomes of our research. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The meaning of decentralisation is not clear-cut and may vary. In general, it can 
be considered as a transfer of fiscal, political, and policy powers to subnational 
governments. Following Rodden (2004), we can consider decentralisation from 
this triple point of view, although he points out that the attempts to define and 
measure decentralisation have focused primarily on fiscal and to a lesser extent 
on policy and political authority.
The most outstanding empirical contributions study the relationship between 
economic growth and fiscal decentralisation1 using the balance of expenditures 
and revenues among governments as indicators, with mixed results. Our interest 
1  For a more detailed analysis of the main contributions in this field, see the first two panels of 
the Appendix.
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in this particular field has to do with the analytical framework and the empirical 
methodology used in international and national literature. Basically, there are two 
groups of contributions. The first one, based on the seminal work of Davoodi – 
Zou (1998), relies on the model of endogenous growth of Barro (1990), where the 
production function has multiple inputs, including private and public spending. 
Lin – Liu (2000) apply the augmented Solow model instead, and introduce fiscal 
decentralisation as an explanatory variable of the growth rate of output per capita. 
More recently, Asatryan – Feld (2015) applied a Bayesian model averaging ap-
proach. Ligthart – van Oudheusden (2017) used a “Barro-style”, non-formally 
derived, growth regression. 
The most used estimation methodology is the simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and the fixed effect (FE) estimator for panel data. Carrion-i-Silvestre et 
al. (2008) and Filippetti – Sacchi (2016) use the system GMM estimator in the 
context of decentralisation. 
For Spain, Gil-Serrate – López-Laborda (2006) and Gil-Serrate et al. (2011) 
obtain a positive link between decentralisation and growth. Cantarero – Pérez 
(2009) only obtain a positive sign in the case of revenue decentralisation, not 
supporting a significant relationship between growth in GDP per capita and 
expenditure distribution among fiscal administrations. Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. 
(2008) found a negative effect at the aggregate economy-wide level. However, 
disaggregating the data leads to a positive effect on economic growth for those 
regions with the highest levels of fiscal and institutional decentralisation, and 
the opposite effect is found for those regions with the lowest levels of decen-
tralised powers. 
Turning to a wider concept of decentralisation,2 introducing political and/or 
administrative powers, its link with economic growth was studied by authors 
such as Castles (1999), Rodríguez-Pose – Ezcurra (2011), and Ezcurra – Ro-
dríguez-Pose (2013), with their results suggesting a lack of or even a negative 
statistical relationship between political decentralisation and economic growth. 
In contrast, Filippetti – Sacchi (2016) find that the pro-growth effects of fiscal de-
centralisation depend critically on the authority of subnational governments: tax 
decentralisation leads to higher (lower) rates of economic growth when coupled 
with high (low) administrative and political decentralisation. Our paper basically 
tries to make a contribution to this line of research based on a wide notion of 
decentralisation.
An alternative approach can be found in Rodríguez-Pose – Bwire (2004). They 
assess the horizontal link between devolution and regional economic growth 
in six national contexts (Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the United 
2 See the third panel of the Appendix.
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States) using regression models in order to test whether changes in cross-regional 
differences in growth patterns within each country considered can be attributed 
to changes in levels of regional autonomy. The results suggest that contrary to 
the expectations of “devolutionists”, the degree of devolution is in most cases, 
Spain among them, irrelevant for economic growth – an empirical finding that is 
consistent with the hypothesis that we aim to test in our paper, using a different 
analytical framework. 
3. DATA AND STATISTICAL SOURCES
 As a first step, we had to build a long historical series for the period 1980–2014. 
The Spanish Statistical Institute (INE) does publish data of the GDP of the CC.AA 
in the Contabilidad Regional de España (Spanish Regional Accounts), but they 
refer to different bases and methodologies. For the population, we used the data 
referred to July 1 from the publication Cifras de Población of INE. 
In Figure 2, we plotted the situation of each region in 1980 and 2014, com-
pared to the average. Extremadura is the relatively poorest region in both 1980 
and 2014. Andalusia and Castile-La Mancha are also in the bottom of the fig-
ure. In contrast, the development of Madrid can be highlighted, which overtook 
Figure 2. GDP per capita of Spanish regions in 1980 and 2014
Note: Average =100 for each year.
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Basque Country and Navarre, and became first in the ranking of the wealthiest 
regions. In the middle, some minor changes can be observed. Nevertheless, it 
must be mentioned that all the regions grew, slightly closing the gap between the 
poorest and the wealthiest. 
The determinants of GDP per capita that we consider are the ones used by 
Mankiw et al. (1992): population growth and investment rate, obtained from the 
database of the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (Valencian 
Institute of Economic Research, IVIE), with information for the period 1980–
2012,3 and defined as the rate of gross non-residential investment over GDP. For 
human capital, the proxy used is the rate of working age population with higher 
education (post-secondary and over), also extracted from the IVIE database, and 
complemented with data from the Encuesta de Población Activa (Labor Force 
Survey) of INE. We also introduced control variables to try to capture structural 
differences among the regions, as is usual in convergence studies. Specifically, 
we consider two: the weight of employment in agriculture over total employment 
in order to capture the role played by economic structure, as in Barro – Sala-i-
Martin (1991) or Maudos et al. (1998), and the unemployment rate to control for 
the effects of the business cycle, as in De la Fuente (2002).
In the second part of our analysis, which constitutes our main empirical con-
tribution, we use several variables related to the powers assigned to the CC.AA 
as proxies for regional authority over policy-making.4 The Spanish Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administration offers a list of the Royal Decrees of transfers 
of competences to the seventeen CC.AA, sorted out by date, and a summary ta-
ble.5 We have built three series from that information: the first contains the total 
number of powers as they were assigned to each CA, the second cumulates those 
data over the period, and the third normalises the second series by the average of 
the 17 CC.AA for each period to capture the effect of having a greater or smaller 
degree of autonomy than the average.  
Another option is not focusing on the total number of competences, but solely 
on the ones that the Ministry considers common, plus university and under-uni-
versity level education, health, and social services (Table 1), 20 being the maxi-
mum number of these common competences. Considering these series, we have 
built a simple common competences index (CC Index), which takes a value of 1 
when the number of common competences is 0–3, a value of 2 when the region 
has between 4 and 7 competences, a value of 3 when there are between 8 and 11, 
a value of 4 between 12 and 15, and a value of 5 between 16 and 20. 
3 Fundación BBVA and IVIE (2014).
4 These series and the corresponding graphs are available from the authors upon request.
5 http://www.seat.mpr.gob.es/portal/areas/politica_autonomica/traspasos.html
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We have also divided the 20 common competences into six areas: health 
(3 competences), education (7 competences), social services (2 competences), 
productive sectors (3 competences), employment (4 competences), and justice 
(1 competence). Each of these areas has a weight (45%, 30%, 10%, 10%, 3%, 
and 2%, respectively), derived from the average amount of public expenditure 
in each field. Finally, we have weighted the cumulated common competences of 
each region, multiplying the number of competences assumed in each area by the 
corresponding weight. As it can be observed, we have tried to combine all the 
main possibilities in this respect, which is uncommon in this literature.  
In the last part of our study, we focus the analysis on the interaction of the CC 
Index with several explanatory variables. In particular, we consider the invest-
ment rate, the percentage of working age population with higher education, the 
average years of schooling, the rate of entrepreneurship, and R&D expenditure, 
Table 1. Proxies for regional authority over policy-making
Number of competences 
as they were transfered
Ranges from 0 to 189
Cumulated number of 
competences
Ranges from 0 to 189
Normalised cumulated 
number of competences
Ranges from 0 to 5
Cumulated common 
competences
Ranges from 1 to 20
Common Competences 
Index
Ranges from 1 to 5
1: 0-3 common competences
2: 4-7 common competences
3: 8-11 common competences
4: 12-15 common competences
5: 16-20 common competences
Weighted Common 
Competences Index 
(Number of powers × 
weight of each area)
Health (45%): Implementation of legislation on pharmaceuticals, 
prison health care, health system (hospitals, staff, medical centers, 
etc.).
Education (30%): Religion teachers, teachers in penal institutions, 
student insurance, scholarships and study assistance, standardisation 
and validation of foreign academic qualifications in non-university 
higher education, non-university and tertiary education.
Social services (10%): Labor and social security inspection, social 
services policies.
Productive sectors (10%): Management of the Spanish Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund, professional diving, nuclear facilities of 2nd and 
3rd categories.
Employment (3%): Occupational professional training, active em-
ployment policies, vocational training for employment, regional em-
ployment services.
Justice (2%): Human and material resources of the administration 
of justice.
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as the Spanish regions have tools to promote them using their budgets. We will 
also consider the informal economy, as its reduction is a desirable policy for 
govern ments in general.
Data for the average years of schooling are obtained from the database of the 
IVIE.6 The rate of entrepreneurship is defined as the number of new companies 
created per ten thousand people, both series available from INE. This is the same 
source used for R&D expenditure. Finally, the weight of the informal economy 
has been calculated on the basis of the data provided by Gómez-Antonio – Alañón 
(2004) and GESTHA-FURV (2014).
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
We will focus on well-known equations used empirically in this literature: the 
regressions à la Barro. In particular, and following the specification proposed by 
Durlauf et al. (2005), the growth equation to be estimated is the following:7 
                                                                                             (1)
where yi,t is the GDP per capita growth in the period under study (1980–2014), 
Yi,0 is the initial GDP per capita and contains the convergence coefficient (β), X 
is the vector that includes the classical determinants of the Solow (1956) and 
Mankiw et al. (1992) models, that is, population growth and physical and human 
capital. Z is the vector that includes additional determinants, in our case, the dif-
ferent proxies for the degree of autonomy. θt represent time effects, αi individual 
effects, and ui,t is the idiosyncratic error term. i refers to the 17 CC.AA and t to 
the period.  
This equation will be estimated within the framework of a dynamic panel. 
We have opted for five-year averages to reduce the effect of short-term shocks 
and the business cycle and capture the long-term relationships among variables, 
avoiding the problem of non-stationarity of the data series, which would cause 
biased results. 
The empirical strategy will be the following: (1) We estimate the MRW model 
in order to test the existence of conditional convergence among Spanish regions; 
(2) we introduce in the growth equation the variables related to the degree of 
6 Fundación Bancaja and IVIE (2014).
7  We use a log-specification in all our equations, except for those variables expressed in per-
centage, so that the estimates are less sensitive to outliers.
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autonomy; (3) we analyse the interaction of variables such as investment, educa-
tion, entrepreneurship, R&D expenditure, and informal economy with our CC 
Index to discover potential synergies among the set of regressors and how they 
actually affect the growth of GDP per capita.8 In that case, with interactions, the 
equation to be estimated would be the following:
  (2)
representing A and B the variables that interact, which can be from the vector X 
or Z. The parameters of interest are π and ρ. If the marginal effect of variable A 
increases with B, ρ would be positive, although the total effect depends on the 
sign of π. 
We will focus our attention on the system GMM estimator.9 In our paper, as 
the sample is small (17), there is a potential problem of instrument proliferation, 
as pointed out in Roodman (2009b), making some of the asymptotic results of the 
estimators and the specification tests inaccurate. To limit the number of instru-
ments, we will use only certain lags.  
5. RESULTS
5.1. The Mankiw-Romer-Weil approach (MRW)
In column (1) of Table 2, we show the results of our estimation based on the ap-
proach developed by Mankiw et al. (1992), over 7 five-year periods (1980–2014). 
We regressed the growth of GDP per capita, conditioned on the initial GDP per 
capita, population growth (plus the rate of technical progress and the rate of de-
preciation of physical capital), non-residential investment rate as percentage of 
GDP, and the rate of working age population with higher education. The negative 
and statistically significant sign associated with the initial GDP per capita con-
firms the existence of conditional beta convergence.10 
For the rest of the variables, as the Solow model predicts, population growth 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on GDP per capita growth, 
 8  For a more detailed description of the specifi cation of interaction models, see Friedrich (1982), 
Braumoeller (2004), or Brambor et al. (2006).
9  See Arellano – Bover (1995) and Blundell – Bond (1998). For its implementation with Stata, 
see Roodman (2009a). 
10  For an overview of the literature on Spanish regional growth and convergence, see Hernán-
dez-Salmerón – Usabiaga (2016).
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while the percentage of working age population with higher education has a posi-
tive and statistically significant effect. In the case of the investment rate, the 
estimated coefficient has a positive sign, although of smaller magnitude than the 
one on human capital, and it is not statistically significant. 
Finally, as for the control variables introduced, the rate of agricultural em-
ployment has an expected statistically significant negative sign, as in Mas et al. 
(1993), and the unemployment rate also shows a negative contribution, which is 
consistent with economic theory, as González-Páramo – Martínez-López (2003) 
Table 2. Benchmark MRW model
(1) (2)
Initial GDP per capita –2.722*
(1.422)
Initial GDP per capita for regions with higher degree 
of autonomy
–2.815*
(1.405)
Initial GDP per capita for regions with lower degree 
of autonomy
–2.822*
(1.406)
Population growth –0.417**
(0.159) 
–0.414**
(0.158)
Investment rate 0.039 
(0.031) 
0.040
(0.032)
Working age population with higher education, % 0.060* 
(0.030) 
0.059*
(0.031)
Agricultural employment rate –0.066** 
(0.024) 
–0.067**
(0.026)
Unemployment rate –0.039 
(0.035) 
–0.044
(0.037)
Constant 30.325** 
(14.248) 
31.313**
(14.223)
Number of instruments 
Arellano-Bond test order 1 
Arellano-Bond test order 2 
Sargan test 
Hansen test 
Number of observations 
89 
–2.60 
(0.009) 
0.74 
(0.46) 
62.14 
(0.874) 
10.49 
(1.000) 
119 
89
–2.61
(0.009)
0.73
(0.465)
62.56
(0.847)
1.70
(1.000)
119
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. Variables are five-year averages covering the pe-
riod 1980–2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the results include 
time dummies, not reported for space reasons. System GMM estimator, option one-step, with all explanatory 
variables being treated as potentially endogenous. Time dummies are considered predetermined. Small sample 
correction and lag (2, 3) was applied, with xtabond2 package for Stata (Roodman 2009a). Robustness checks 
were also implemented, considering alternative specifications of GMM system, which can be provided by the 
authors upon request.
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pointed out. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, regions with a higher 
ratio of workers employed in the primary sector and higher unemployment rate 
experienced lower GDP per capita growth than the rest. 
Thus, in short, we could point out that certain features of the economic structure 
and inefficient labour markets appear to be harmful to the process of catching up 
among the regions. The specialisation in the least productive sectors such as ag-
riculture conditions the attainable income level (steady-state), dragging potential 
economic growth. In contrast, human capital could favour growth. On this point, 
De la Fuente – Doménech (2016) suggest that the significant differences in the 
years of schooling probably explain the huge disparities in productivity, unem-
ployment rate, and income per capita among Spanish regions. Furthermore, when 
they work with the information disaggregated by age ranges, they find that based 
on current patterns of schooling and in the absence of large migration flows, the 
prospects for further educational convergence between regions are scarce.
We also checked if the analysis of conditional convergence varies if we con-
sider the degree of regional autonomy (column 2). For that purpose, the same es-
timation was implemented decomposing the initial GDP per capita into two vari-
ables. The first variable, initial GDP per capita for regions with a higher degree 
of autonomy, was obtained by multiplying the initial level of income by a dummy 
variable that took the value 1 if the region accessed autonomy using Article 151 
of the CE or is a foral region, and 0 otherwise. The second variable, GDP per 
capita for regions with a lower degree of autonomy, was obtained by multiplying 
the initial GDP per capita by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the region accessed 
autonomy using Article 143 of the CE, and 0 otherwise. These results also con-
firm the existence of conditional beta convergence, with significant and similar 
coefficients, this last result being supported by the test of equality of coefficients. 
The results for the rest of the variables follow the aforementioned patterns.
5.2. Effects of the degree of regional autonomy
The estimation obtained in the first subsection constitutes our benchmark. In the 
present subsection, we will progressively introduce what we have considered as 
proxy variables for the degree of regional autonomy, so that we can assess the ef-
fect of the number of transferred competences on GDP per capita growth.
In most of the cases, the coefficient associated with initial GDP per capita de-
creases in comparison with our benchmark estimation when the decentralisation 
variable is taken into account. This may indicate that this variable had a positive 
contribution to the process of catching-up among regions. Let us analyse the re-
sults for each proxy.
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Table 3 shows a positive, though not statistically significant, relationship be-
tween the total number of powers assumed by regions and GDP per capita growth 
(column 1). When we consider either the total number of powers (column 2), 
or the common powers (column 4), both in cumulative terms, the coefficient is 
equal to zero, reflecting that neither of these variables explains GDP per capita 
Table 3. Benchmark MRW model augmented with different proxies of decentralisation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial GDP per capita –2.803* –2.678* –2.723* –2.671* –2.719* –2.690*
(1.421) (1.451) (1.437) (1.461) (1.414) (1.398)
Population growth –0.412** –0.428** –0.422** –0.433** –0.424** –0.428**
(0.152) (0.159) (0.155) (0.150) (0.155) (0.150)
Investment rate 0.049 0.044 0.047 0.042 0.039 0.038
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Working age population with 
higher education, %
0.063** 0.058* 0.060* 0.058* 0.059* 0.059*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Agricultural employment rate –0.068** –0.067** –0.067** –0.066** –0.065** –0.065**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Unemployment rate –0.040 –0.039 –0.041 –0.039 –0.040 –0.039
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Total competences 0.038
(0.048)
Cumulated total competences 0.000
(0.003)
Cumulated total competences 
versus regional average
0.053
(0.247)
Cumulated common competences 0.000 
(0.026)
Common competences Index (CC 
Index) 
0.030 
(0.106)
Weighted cumulated common 
competences
0.020 
(0.128)
Constant 30.556** 29.921* 30.240* 29.900* 30.316** 30.082**
(14.175) (14.482) (14.315) (14.655) (14.211) (14.068)
Number of instruments 92 92 92 92 90 92
Arellano-Bond test order 1 –2.590 –2.600 –2.590 –2.600 –2.620 –2.600
(0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Arellano-Bond test order 2 0.770 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.730 0.750
(0.44) (0.457) (0.462) (0.457) (0.464) (0.455)
Sargan test 67.090 66.800 67.200 66.750 65.090 65.670
(0.806) (0.813) (0.804) (0.814) (0.81) (0.839)
Hansen test 9.470 3.360 2.960 8.750 5.760 7.190
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Note: See the notes to Table 2.
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growth. In the case of cumulated total powers vs. the regional average (column 
3), a positive but not significant impact arises, which may suggest that if a region 
has a higher degree of autonomy than the average, it would grow at a relatively 
higher pace than the rest. 
In column 5, we introduced the CC Index in the estimation. Again, the impact 
is positive, but statistically insignificant. Finally, in column 6, we worked with 
weighted cumulated common competencies, obtaining the same result: a positive 
effect on GDP per capita growth, which fails to appear significantly. 
5.3. Marginal effects of explanatory variables, according to the Common 
Competences Index
The Spanish regions have competences on supply-side policies such as public 
investment, education, entrepreneurship, and research, development and inno-
vation. Thus, it is interesting to analyse the direct effect of these variables on 
GDP per capita growth and their marginal effect, when we consider the different 
degree of regional autonomy as measured by the CC Index (Table 4). This could 
shed light on the achievements of regional policy on variables of its influence. 
In column 1, an interaction between the CC Index and the investment rate was 
introduced. In this case, the coefficients for both variables become negative, with 
the interaction term being positive, but not statistically significant. Figure 3 rep-
resents the value of the marginal effect according to the CC Index. The marginal 
effect of the investment rate is slightly above zero for regions with low CC Index, 
increasing the positive effect as the CC Index rises. It could suggest that having 
more decentralised powers has a positive effect on investment and its impact on 
growth.
In the case of education, we used the percentage of working age population 
with higher education (column 2) and the average years of schooling (column 4). 
For the first one, it does not seem to have a complementarity, being the coefficient 
of the interaction positive but nearly zero (Figure 4). The effect does not vary 
depending on the existence of more or less autonomy. On the other hand, when 
the average years of schooling are used, the interaction is positive, though not sta-
tistically significant, and the marginal effect is almost zero regardless of the value 
of the CC Index (Figure 5). According to this, regional education policy does 
not seem to have a differential impact in regions with higher or lower number of 
transferred powers, while human capital in general bears a positive and statisti-
cally significant impact on GDP per capita growth.
Another relevant determinant of GDP per capita is entrepreneurship, as can be 
seen in column 5 of Table 4. To proxy this variable, we use the entrepreneurship 
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rate, measured as the number of new companies created (per 10,000 people). 
A positive and statistically significant coefficient is obtained. We then analyse if 
the degree of regional autonomy has any kind of interaction with the entrepre-
neurship rate to explain GDP per capita growth (column 6), being the coefficient 
of the interaction negative and statistically significant.
The results show that as decentralisation increases, the marginal effect of 
entrepreneurship decreases, although just slightly (Figure 6). Or the other way 
round, when the entrepreneurship rate is high enough (around 21 new companies 
created per 10,000 people), the marginal effect of CC Index would be zero, and it 
would have a negative impact on GDP per capita growth for higher values. This 
could suggest that perhaps an economy with a high entrepreneurship rate would 
not need additional policy action to generate positive effects on GDP growth. 
Innovation is another key variable for regional policymakers. When we in-
troduce the R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP, the estimated coefficient is 
positive, as expected, although statistically insignificant (column 7). A positive 
complementarity is also observed when we interact this variable with the CC In-
dex (column 8). Furthermore, it appears that a higher degree of decentralisation 
fosters the positive effect of the R&D expenditure (Figure 7).
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One possible extension that can be considered, due to its relative importance 
in the Spanish economy, is the impact of the informal economy and its potential 
interaction with the level of regional autonomy. A positive relationship is found, 
though statistically insignificant, between the level of informal economy and GDP 
per capita growth (column 9), which can be explained by the fact that the informal 
economy accounts, on average, for nearly one-quarter of the Spanish GDP, gen-
erating several possible connections with the rest of the economy. Never theless, 
when we consider the interaction with the CC Index, the coefficient appears to be 
negative, so that when decentralisation reaches its maximum level, the marginal 
effect of the informal economy becomes negative (Figure 8). In contrast, when 
the CC Index takes value 1, the marginal effect remains positive. Thus, it seems 
that having more regional autonomy could discourage the informal economy in 
the sense that it would not have a positive impact on GDP per capita growth. 
Finally, we have decomposed the CC Index into two variables, one that con-
tains regions with higher degree of autonomy, and the rest (columns 11 and 12, 
respectively). As we expected, the complementarity is positive in the case of re-
gions which accessed sooner to a higher level of decentralised powers, while it 
is negative for the rest of the regions. In any case, neither of the coefficients is 
statistically significant.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We analysed the convergence and growth process of Spanish regions since the be-
ginning of the decentralisation process in the early 1980s. For that purpose, a dy-
namic panel data analysis was conducted applying the system GMM estimator. 
In the benchmank specification, which corresponds to the regression of GDP 
per capita growth conditioned on the initial level of GDP per capita, population 
growth, the non-residential investment rate, the rate of working age population 
with higher education, and the control variables (rate of agricultural employment 
and unemployment rate), a statistically significant and negative sign is obtained 
for the initial GDP per capita level. This would confirm the existence of a proc-
ess of catching-up among the regions, but at a very low pace. In conclusion, 
the regional convergence policy did not have the expected success. Population 
growth has the expected negative effect, as the Solow model predicts, while hu-
man capital seems to foster growth. In the case of the investment rate, the esti-
mated coefficient is positive, though it is not statistically significant. Finally, both 
control variables present negative coefficients, which suggests that having a high 
proportion of employment in the primary sector and a high unemployment rate 
is a drag on growth, lowering the steady-state levels. Therefore, in general, the 
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empirical evidence for Spanish regions confirms the expected results, also ren-
dering a positive contribution of innovation and entrepreneurship, key elements 
for regional policymakers. 
For the sake of robustness, the process of transfer of powers was proxied by 
several indicators that took into account the total number of competences as-
sumed by regional governments, or just the powers that are considered common. 
In particular, we built a CC Index that ranges between 1 and 5, trying to measure 
the degree of autonomy of a region. Overall, it seems that the capacity of a region 
to implement policies has a positive contribution to GDP per capita growth, al-
though the results are not statistically significant. Further extensions of that index 
considering a wider definition of decentralisation would need to be investigated. 
We have tried to shed light on the achievement of regional policy. We have 
selected four areas: public investment, education, entrepreneurship, and research, 
development and innovation. We have analysed the direct effect of these vari-
ables on GDP per capita growth and their marginal effect, when we consider the 
different degree of regional autonomy measured by the CC Index. In general, it 
seems that a higher number of decentralised powers involves a stronger positive 
effect of the indicators on GDP per capita growth, with the exception of entre-
preneurship, whose positive effect would fade and even become neutral, but just 
when the CC Index takes the upper value. 
Another possible extension that we have considered interesting, due to its rela-
tive importance in the Spanish economy, is the impact of the informal economy 
and its potential interaction with the level of regional autonomy. A slightly positive 
relationship between the level of informal economy and GDP per capita growth is 
found. Nevertheless, when we consider the interaction with the CC Index, it ap-
pears to be negative, so that when the decentralisation reaches its maximum level, 
the marginal effect of the informal economy becomes negative. 
When we decompose the CC Index into two variables, one that contains the 
regions with higher degree of autonomy, and the rest, as expected, we obtain a 
positive complementarity in the case of the regions which accessed sooner to a 
higher level of competences, while it is negative for the rest of the regions. In any 
case, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant. Again, the emphasis on 
decentralisation to foster regional growth is not clearly supported. In sum, our 
empirical analysis concludes that this factor does not significantly affect eco-
nomic growth.   
Our analysis invites further research on these uncovered relationships between 
regional growth and the process of transfer of powers, using alternative data and 
methods, for example, by introducing spatial econometrics. The renewed interest 
in the analysis of regional growth and convergence deserves further deepening in 
this type of analysis, from all possible perspectives. 
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